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Monetary policy transmission in India 
Rakesh Mohan
1 
Key to the efficient conduct of monetary policy is the condition that it must exert a systematic 
influence on the economy in a forward-looking sense. A priori economic theory backed by 
some empirical evidence has identified the main channels through which monetary policy 
impacts its final targets, viz, output, employment and inflation. Broadly, the vehicles of 
monetary transmission can be classified into financial market prices (eg, interest rates, 
exchange rates, yields, asset prices, equity prices) or financial market quantities (money 
supply, credit aggregates, supply of government bonds and foreign denominated assets). It 
is recognized that, whereas these channels are not mutually exclusive, the relative 
importance of each channel may differ from one economy to another depending on a number 
of factors, including the underlying structural characteristics, the state of development of 
financial markets, the instruments available to monetary policy, the fiscal stance and the 
degree of openness. 
Traditionally, four key channels of monetary policy transmission are identified, viz, interest 
rate, credit aggregates, asset prices and exchange rate channels. The interest rate channel 
emerges as the dominant transmission mechanism of monetary policy. An expansionary 
monetary policy, for instance, is expected to lead to a lowering of the cost of loanable funds, 
which, in turn, raises investment and consumption demand and should eventually be 
reflected in aggregate output and prices. Monetary policy also operates on aggregate 
demand through changes in the availability of loanable funds, ie, the credit channel. It is, 
however, relevant to note that the “credit channel” is not a distinct, free-standing alternative 
to the traditional transmission mechanism but should rather be seen as a channel that can 
amplify and propagate conventional interest rate effects (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
Nevertheless, it is fair to regard the credit channel as running alongside the interest rate 
channel to produce monetary effects on real activity (RBI, 2002). Changes in interest rates 
by the monetary authorities also induce movements in asset prices to generate wealth 
effects in terms of market valuations of financial assets and liabilities. Higher interest rates 
can induce an appreciation of the domestic currency, which in turn leads to a reduction in net 
exports and, hence, in aggregate demand and output. 
In the recent period, a fifth channel – expectations – has assumed prominence in the conduct 
of forward-looking monetary policy in view of its influence on the traditional four channels. 
For example, the link between short- and long-term real rates is widely believed to follow 
from the expectational hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. In a generalized 
context, the expectations channel of monetary policy postulates that the beliefs of economic 
agents about future shocks to the economy as well as the central bank’s reactions can affect 
the variables that are determined in a forward-looking manner. Thus, “open-mouth operation” 
by the central bank, ie, an announcement of future central bank policy, influences 
expectations in financial markets and leads to changes in output and inflation. Clearly, the 
credibility of the monetary authority drives the expectations channel. 
The rest of the paper focuses on the Indian experience with monetary policy transmission. 
Section I delineates the objectives of monetary policy in India. Section II presents the 
framework and instruments of monetary policy alongside the evolution of institutional 
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developments which were to have a fundamental bearing on the monetary policy 
transmission. Section III discusses the monetary policy transmission channels: operating 
procedures, channel of bank lending and rates, debt market channel, exchange rate channel, 
and communication and expectations channel. Section IV makes an assessment of monetary 
transmission in terms of the ultimate objectives of monetary policy: price stability and growth. 
Section V discusses what is needed to improve monetary transmission. In conclusion, 
Section VI sums up the challenges and dilemmas of monetary policy. 
I.  Objectives of monetary policy 
The short title to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 sets out the objectives of the Bank: “to 
regulate the issue of Bank notes and the keeping of reserves with a view to securing 
monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the 
country to its advantage”. Although there has not been any explicit legislation for price 
stability, the twin objectives of monetary policy in India are widely regarded as (i) price 
stability and (ii) provision of adequate credit to productive sectors of the economy so as to 
support aggregate demand and ensure high and sustained growth. With the increasing 
openness of the Indian economy, greater emphasis has been laid in recent years on 
strengthening the institutional capacity in the country to support growth consistent with 
stability in the medium term. Given the overarching consideration for sustained growth in the 
context of high levels of poverty and inequality, price stability has evolved as the dominant 
objective of monetary policy. The underlying philosophy is that it is only in a low and stable 
inflation environment that economic growth can be sustained.  
In recent years, financial stability has assumed priority in the conduct of monetary policy in 
view of the increasing openness of the Indian economy, financial integration and possibility of 
cross border contagion. Strong synergies and complementarities are observed between price 
stability and financial stability in India. Accordingly, regulation, supervision and development 
of the financial system remain in India within the legitimate ambit of monetary policy, broadly 
interpreted. 
II.  Framework and instruments 
Prior to the mid-1980s, there was no formal enunciation of monetary policy objectives, 
instruments and transmission channels in India other than that of administering the 
supply/allocation of and demand for credit in alignment with the needs of a planned 
economy. Over the period from 1985 to 1997, India followed a monetary policy framework 
that could broadly be characterised as one of loose and flexible monetary targeting with 
feedback (Annex I). Under this approach, growth in broad money supply (M3) was projected 
in a manner consistent with expected GDP growth and a tolerable level of inflation. The M3 
growth thus worked out was considered a nominal anchor for policy. Reserve money (RM) 
was used as the operating target and bank reserves as the operating instrument. As 
deregulation increased the role of market forces in the determination of interest rates and the 
exchange rate, monetary targeting, even in its flexible mode, came under stress. Capital 
flows increased liquidity exogenously, putting upward pressure on the money supply, prices 
and the exchange rates, the latter having gained importance vis à vis quantity variables. 
While most studies in India showed that money demand functions had been fairly stable, it 
was increasingly felt that financial innovations and technology had systematically eroded the 
predictive potential of money demand estimations relative to the past. Interest rates gained 
relative influence on the decision to hold money. Accordingly, the monetary policy framework 
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based multiple indicator approach from 1998–99. In this approach, policy perspectives are 
obtained by juxtaposing interest rates and other rates of return in different markets (money, 
capital and government securities markets), which are available at high frequency with 
medium and low frequency variables such as currency, credit extended by banks and 
financial institutions, the fiscal position, trade and capital flows, inflation rate, exchange rate, 
refinancing and transactions in foreign exchange and output. For simplicity and to facilitate 
greater understanding, the quarterly policy statements of the Reserve Bank continue to be 
set in a framework in terms of money, output and prices.  
Since the late 1980s, there has been an enhanced emphasis by many central banks on 
securing operational freedom for monetary policy and investing it with a single goal, best 
embodied in the growing independence of central banks and inflation targeting as an 
operational framework for monetary policy, which has important implications for transmission 
channels. In this context, the specific features of the Indian economy have led to the 
emergence of a somewhat contrarian view: “In India, we have not favoured the adoption of 
inflation targeting, while keeping the attainment of low inflation as a central objective of 
monetary policy, along with that of high and sustained growth that is so important for a 
developing economy. Apart from the legitimate concern regarding growth as a key objective, 
there are other factors that suggest that inflation targeting may not be appropriate for India. 
First, unlike many other developing countries we have had a record of moderate inflation, 
with double digit inflation being the exception, and largely socially unacceptable. Second, 
adoption of inflation targeting requires the existence of an efficient monetary transmission 
mechanism through the operation of efficient financial markets and absence of interest rate 
distortions. In India, although the money market, government debt and forex markets have 
indeed developed in recent years, they still have some way to go, whereas the corporate 
debt market is still to develop. Though interest rate deregulation has largely been 
accomplished, some administered interest rates still persist. Third, inflationary pressures still 
often emanate from significant supply shocks related to the effect of the monsoon on 
agriculture, where monetary policy action may have little role. Finally, in an economy as large 
as that of India, with various regional differences, and continued existence of market 
imperfections in factor and product markets between regions, the choice of a universally 
acceptable measure of inflation is also difficult” (Mohan, 2006b). 
The success of a framework that relies on indirect instruments of monetary management 
such as interest rates is contingent upon the extent and speed with which changes in the 
central bank’s policy rate are transmitted to the spectrum of market interest rates and 
exchange rate in the economy and onward to the real sector. Clearly, monetary transmission 
cannot take place without efficient price discovery, particularly with respect to interest rates 
and exchange rates. Therefore, in the efficient functioning of financial markets, the 
corresponding development of the full financial market spectrum becomes necessary. In 
addition, the growing integration of the Indian economy with the rest of the world has to be 
recognized and provided for. Accordingly, reforms have been undertaken which focus on 
improving the operational effectiveness of monetary policy, while simultaneously 
strengthening the regulatory role of the Reserve Bank, tightening the prudential and 
supervisory norms, improving the credit delivery system and developing the technological 
and institutional framework of the financial sector. 
Market development 
Given the pivotal role of the money market in transmission, efforts initiated in the late 1980s 
were intensified over the full spectrum. Following the withdrawal of the ceiling on inter-bank 
money market rates in 1989, several financial innovations in terms of money market 
instruments such as certificate of deposits, commercial paper and money market mutual 
funds were introduced in phases. Barriers to entry were gradually eased by increasing the 
number of players and relaxing the issuance and subscription norms in respect of money 
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market was widened to cover primary and satellite dealers and corporates (through primary 
dealers), besides other participants. In order to improve monetary transmission, and also for 
prudential considerations, steps were initiated in 1999 to turn the call money market into a 
pure inter-bank market and, simultaneously, to develop a repo market outside the official 
window for providing a stable collateralised funding alternative, particularly to non-banks who 
were phased out of the call segment, and banks. The Collateralised Borrowing and Lending 
Obligation (CBLO), a repo instrument developed by the Clearing Corporation of India Limited 
(CCIL) for its members, with the CCIL acting as a central counterparty for borrowers and 
lenders, was permitted as a money market instrument in 2002. With the development of 
market repo and CBLO segments, the call money market has been transformed into a pure 
inter-bank market, including primary dealers, since August 2005. A recent noteworthy 
development is the substantial migration of money market activity from the uncollateralised 
call money segment to the collateralised market repo and CBLO markets (Annex II). Thus, 
uncollateralized overnight transactions are now limited to banks and primary dealers in the 
interests of financial stability (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Activity in money market segments 
Rupees billion 
Average daily turnover (one leg) 
Year/ 
month  Call money 
market 
Market 











1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
2003–04
1   86   26   3   3  78   32 
2004–05
1   71   43   34   3  117   61 
2005–06
1   90   53   100   4  173   273 
2006–07           
April   85   55   163   5  165   441 
May   90   90   172   5  169   502 
June   87   106   138   6  197   564 
July   91   97   157   4  211   592 
August   107   78   156   5  229   656 
September   118   92   148   6  244   653 
October   132   97   170   5  232   658 
November   128   94   161   4  242   689 
December   121   72   155   5  233   686 
CBLO: Collateralised borrowing and lending obligation. 
1  The average daily turnover (one leg) for a year is arrived at by adding daily turnovers (one leg) and then 
dividing the sum by the number of days in the year. 
Source: Macroeconomic and Monetary Developments, various issues, RBI. 
 
The Government securities market is important for the entire debt market as it serves as a 
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transmission across the yield curve. The key policy development that has enabled a more 
independent monetary policy environment as well as the development of the Government 
securities market was the discontinuation of automatic monetization of the government’s 
fiscal deficit since April 1997 through an agreement between the Government and the 
Reserve Bank of India in September 1994 (Annex III). Subsequently, enactment of the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003 has strengthened the institutional 
mechanism further: from April 2006 onwards, the Reserve Bank is no longer permitted to 
subscribe to government securities in the primary market. This step completes the transition 
to a fully market-based system for Government securities. Looking ahead, consequent to the 
recommendations of the Twelfth Finance Commission, the Central Government would cease 
to raise resources on behalf of State Governments, which, henceforth, will have to access 
the market directly. Thus, State Governments’ ability to raise resources will be market-
determined and based on their own financial health. To ensure a smooth transition, 
institutional processes are being revamped towards greater integration in monetary 
operations. 
As regards the foreign exchange market, reforms have been focused on market 
development, incorporating prudential safeguards so that the market would not be 
destabilised in the process. The move towards a market-based exchange rate regime in 
1993, the subsequent adoption of current account convertibility and de-facto capital account 
convertibility for select categories of non-residents were the key enabling factors in reforming 
the Indian foreign exchange market prior to now. India’s approach to financial integration has 
so far been gradual and cautious, guided by signposts/concomitants in terms of improvement 
in fiscal, inflation and financial sector indicators, inter alia. Efforts are currently underway to 
move towards fuller capital account convertibility even for residents. In the period 2000–06, a 
number of measures were initiated to integrate the Indian forex market with the global 
financial system, with increasing freedom given to banks to borrow abroad and fix their own 
position and gap limits (Annex IV). 
The development of the monetary policy framework has also involved a great deal of 
institutional initiatives in the area of trading, payments and settlement systems along with the 
provision of technological infrastructure. The interaction of technology with deregulation has 
also contributed to the emergence of a more open, competitive and globalised financial 
market. While the policy measures in the pre-1990s period were essentially devoted to 
financial deepening, the focus of reforms in the last decade and a half has been on 
engendering greater efficiency and productivity in the banking system (Annex V). Legislative 
amendments have also been carried out to strengthen the RBI’s regulatory jurisdiction over 
financial markets, providing greater instrument independence and, hence, ensuring monetary 
transmission. 
The relative weights assigned to various channels of transmission of monetary policy also 
reflect a conscious effort to move from direct instruments of monetary control to indirect 
instruments. Illustratively, the CRR, which had been brought down from a peak of 15 per cent 
in 1994–95 to 4.5 per cent by June 2003, before the onset of withdrawal of monetary 
accommodation, since October 2004 is now 6.0 per cent (Chart 1). The recent amendment to 
the RBI Act in 2006 will further strengthen monetary maneuverability since it allows for the 
removal of the floor of 3 per cent and ceiling of 15 per cent on the CRR. Monetary control is 
also exercised through the prescription of a statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), which is a variant 
of the secondary reserve requirement in several countries. It is maintained in the form of 
specified assets such as cash, gold and “approved” and unencumbered securities – the latter 
being explicitly prescribed – as a proportion of banks’ net demand and time liabilities (NDTL). 
Accordingly, the SLR is also important for prudential purposes, ie, to assure the soundness 
of the banking system. The pre-emption under the SLR, which had increased to about 
38.5 per cent of NDTL in the beginning of the 1990s, was brought to its statutory minimum of 
25 per cent by October 1997. Banks, however, continue to hold more government securities 
than the statutory minimum SLR, reflecting risk perception and portfolio choice. The statutory 264  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
minimum SLR of 25 per cent has been removed now (January 2007) to provide for greater 
flexibility in the RBI’s monetary policy operations. The reform of the monetary and financial 
sectors has thus enabled the Reserve Bank to expand the array of instruments at its 












































































III.  Operating procedure for monetary policy 
Short-term interest rates have emerged as the key indicators of the monetary policy stance 
all over the world. It is also recognised that stability in financial markets is critical for efficient 
price discovery and meaningful signaling. Since the interest rate and exchange rate are key 
prices reflecting the cost of money, it is particularly important for efficient functioning of the 
economy that they be market-determined and easily observed. 
Central banks follow a variety of operating frameworks and procedures for signaling and 
implementing the monetary policy stance on a day-to-day basis, with a view to achieving the 
ultimate objectives – price stability and growth. The choice of policy framework in any 
economy is always a difficult one and depends on the stage of macro-economic and financial 
sector development, and is somewhat of an evolutionary process (Mohan, 2006a). In a 
market-oriented financial system, central banks typically use instruments that are directly 
under their control: required reserve ratios, interest charged on borrowed reserves (discount 
window) provided directly or through rediscounting of financial assets held by depository 
institutions, open market operations (OMOs) and selective credit controls. These instruments 
are usually directed at attaining a prescribed value of the operating target, typically bank 
reserves and/or a very short-term interest rate (usually the overnight interbank rate). The 
optimal choice between price and quantity targets would depend on the sources of 
disturbances in the goods and money markets (Poole, 1970). If money demand is viewed as 
highly unstable, greater output stability can be attained by stabilizing interest rates. If, 
however, the main source of short-run instability arises from aggregate spending or 
unsterilized capital inflows, a policy that stabilizes monetary aggregates could be desirable. 
In reality, it often becomes difficult to trace out the sources of instability. Instead, monetary 
policy is implemented by fixing, at least over the short time horizon, the value of an operating 
target or policy instrument. As additional information about the economy is obtained, the 
appropriate level at which to fix the policy instrument/target changes. 
The operating procedures of monetary policy of most central banks have largely converged 
to one of the following three variants: (i) a number of central banks, including the US Federal 
Reserve, estimate the demand for bank reserves and then carry out open market operations 
to target short-term interest rates; (ii) another set of central banks, of which the Bank of BIS Papers No 35  265
 
 
Japan used to be a part until recently, estimate market liquidity and carry out open market 
operations to target bank reserves, while allowing interest rates to adjust; and (iii) a growing 
number of central banks, including the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, 
modulate monetary conditions in terms of both quantum and price of liquidity, through a mix 
of OMOs, standing facilities and minimum reserve requirements, and changes in the policy 
rate. The operating procedure followed in India, however, presents a fourth variant.  
III.1  Money markets and the liquidity adjustment facility 
In the Indian context, reforms in the monetary policy operating framework, which were 
initiated in the late 1980s, crystallised into the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) in 2000 
(Annex VI). Under the LAF, the Reserve Bank sets its policy rates, ie, repo and reverse repo 
rates, and carries out repo/reverse repo operations, thereby providing a corridor for overnight 
money market rates (Chart 2). The LAF avoids targeting a particular level of overnight money 
market rate in view of exogenous influences impacting liquidity at the shorter end, viz, volatile 
government cash balances and unpredictable foreign exchange flows.  
Although repo auctions can be conducted at variable or fixed rates for overnight or longer-
term, given market preference and the need to transmit interest rate signals quickly, the LAF 
has settled into a fixed rate overnight auction mode since April 2004. With the introduction of 
Second LAF (SLAF) from November 28, 2005, market participants now have a second 
window during the day to fine-tune their liquidity management (Chart 3). LAF operations 
continue to be supplemented by access to the Reserve Bank’s standing facilities linked to 
repo rate: export credit refinance to banks and standing liquidity facility to the primary 
dealers. 
Chart 2 
Liquidity adjustment facility and money  
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The introduction of LAF has had several advantages. First and foremost, it made possible 
the transition from direct instruments of monetary control to indirect instruments. Since LAF 
operations enabled reduction in CRR without loss of monetary control, certain dead weight 
loss for the system was saved. Second, LAF has provided monetary authorities with greater 
flexibility in determining both the quantum of adjustment and the rates by responding to the 266  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
needs of the system on a daily basis. Third and most importantly, although there is no formal 
targeting of a point overnight interest rate, LAF helped to stabilise overnight call rates within 
a specified corridor, the difference between the fixed repo and reverse repo rates currently 
being 150 basis points. It has thus enabled the central bank to affect demand for funds 
through policy rate changes. In this sense, LAF rates perform the role of nominal anchor 
effectively. Although call money rates edged above the repo rate in January–February 2006, 
the rates in the collateralised segment of the money market – market repos and Collateralised 
Borrowing and Lending Obligations (CBLO), which account for nearly 80 per cent of the 
market turnover – remained below the repo rate. 
Chart 3 
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III.2  Market stabilisation scheme 
In the context of increasing openness of the economy, a market-determined exchange rate 
and large capital inflows, monetary management may warrant sterilizing foreign exchange 
market intervention, partly or wholly, so as to retain the intent of monetary policy. Initially, the 
Reserve Bank sterilized capital inflows by way of OMOs. Such sterilization, however, 
involves cost in terms of lower returns on international assets vis-à-vis domestic assets 
(Chart 4). The finite stock of government securities with the Reserve Bank also limited its 
ability to sterilize. The LAF operations, which are essentially designed to take care of 
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The Reserve Bank, therefore, signed in March 2004 a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
with the Government of India for issuance of Treasury Bills and dated Government Securities 
under the Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS), in addition to normal Government borrowings 
(Annex VII). The new instrument empowered the Reserve Bank to absorb liquidity on a more 
enduring but still temporary basis while leaving LAF for daily liquidity management and using 
conventional OMO on a more enduring basis (Chart 5). The MSS has provided the Reserve 
Bank with the flexibility not only to absorb but also to inject liquidity in times of need by way 



























































































Net LAF MSS GOI Cash Balances Net Forex Intervention
 
The various tools of liquidity management have thus enabled the Reserve Bank to maintain 
liquidity conditions and orderly movement in both exchange rates and interest rates, and 




Phases of Reserve Bank’s liquidity management operations 
Rupees billion 
  Variation during 




1  2  3  4  5  6 
A.  Drivers of liquidity (1 + 2 + 3 + 4)  721  581  –317  355  –158 
1.  RBI’s foreign currency assets (adjusted 
for revaluation) 
1414  1150  688  285  105 
2.  Currency with the Public  –434  –409  –573  –215  –1 
3.  Surplus cash balances of the centre with 
the Reserve Bank 
–177  5  –227  402  –262 
4.  Others (residual)  –83  –165  –205  –118  –1 
B.  Management of liquidity (5 + 6 + 7 + 8) –464  –567  580  –390  320 
5.  Liquidity impact of LAF Repos  –322  153  121  –353  407 
6.  Liquidity impact of OMO (Net)
1  –176  12  107  5  1 
7.  Liquidity impact of MSS  0  –642  351  –42  –88 
8.  First round liquidity impact due to CRR 
change 
35  –90  0  0  0 
C.  Bank Reserves (A + B)
2  257  14  263  –35  162 
Note: Data pertain to March 31 and last Friday for all other months. 
(+)  Indicates injection of liquidity into the banking system.    (–)  Indicates absorption of liquidity from the banking 
system. 
1    Adjusted for Consolidated Sinking Funds (CSF) and Other Investments and including private placement.
2  Includes vault cash with banks and adjusted for first round liquidity impact due to CRR change. 
Source: Annual Report and Macroeconomic and Monetary Developments, various issues, RBI.  
 
Government cash balances with the Reserve Bank often display sizeable volatility. First, due 
to operational requirements which are difficult to predict (except for salary payments, 
coupon/interest payments, redemption of loans and the like), the Government needs to 
maintain a substantial cash position with the Reserve Bank. Second, there is the need for 
maintaining or building up cash balances gradually over many weeks ahead of large, known 
disbursements such as lumpy redemption of bonds contracted for financing high fiscal deficit 
and, particularly, benchmark bonds, if markets are not to be disrupted. Third, while a major 
part of outflows from government cash balances is regular, inflows by way of direct tax 
revenues and other sources are lumpy and irregular in nature.  
Accumulating Government cash balances with the central bank act, in effect, as withdrawal 
of liquidity from the system and have the same effect as that of monetary tightening, albeit 
without any intention to do so by the monetary authority. Similarly, there would be injection of 
liquidity into the system if Government cash balances maintained with the central bank 
decline, despite a situation in which, for instance, monetary policy is biased towards 
tightening liquidity. Thus, volatile Government cash balances could cause unanticipated 
expansion or contraction of the monetary base, and consequently, money supply and BIS Papers No 35  269
 
 
liquidity, which may not necessarily be consistent with the prevailing stance of monetary 
policy. In the presence of fluctuating Government cash balances, the task of monetary 
management becomes complicated, often warranting offsetting measures, partly or wholly, 
so as to retain the intent of monetary policy. 
III.3  Bank credit and lending rate channels 
There is some evidence of the bank lending channel working in addition to the conventional 
interest rate channel. In view of the asymmetry in the resource base, access to non-deposit 
sources, asset allocation and liquidity, big and small banks are found to respond in significantly 
different ways. In particular, small banks are more acutely affected by contractionary monetary 
policy shocks as compared to big banks, ie, smaller banks curtail their lending more sharply 
vis-à-vis large banks (Pandit et al, 2006). Available empirical evidence also indicates that 
prudential norms, as proxied by banks’ capital adequacy ratios, exert a significant influence on 
bank lending (Annex IX, Nag and Das, 2002; Pandit et al, 2006). 
Table 3 






March 2006  March 2005  March 2004 
Non-food gross bank credit  100  100  100  100 
1.  Agriculture and allied activities  12  12  13  12 
2.  Industry (small, medium and 
large) 39  39  43  43 
2.1  Small scale industries  6  6  8  9 
3. Services  2  3  3  … 
3.1 Transport  operators  1  1  1  … 
3.2 Professional  and  others  1  1  1  … 
4. Personal  loans  26  25  25  … 
4.1 Housing  14  13  13  … 
4.2 Advances  against  fixed 
deposits 2  3  3  4 
4.3 Credit  cards  1  1  1  … 
4.4 Education  1  1  1  … 
4.5 Consumer  durables  1  1  1  1 
5. Trade  6  6  6  3 
6. Others  9  14  11  41 
6.1  Real estate loans  2  2  1  1 
6.2 Non-banking  financial 
companies  2 2 2 2 
Memo item      
Bank credit-GDP ratio   40.3
1   42.2   35.2   30.4 
Note: Sectoral shares may not add up to 100 due to rounding off. 
1  Approximately. 
Source: Annual Report 2005–06, RBI. 270  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
The monetary policy stance of the Bank is often articulated as a commitment to ensure that 
all genuine requirements for bank credit are adequately met in order to support investment 
and export demand consistent with price stability (Annex X). Liquidity operations are 
conducted with a view to ensuring that the demand for reserves is satisfied and credit 
projections consistent with macro-economic objectives are achieved. Simultaneously, 
improvements in the delivery of bank credit are pursued in recognition of the possibility of 
market failure in efficiently auctioning credit. An integral element of the conduct of monetary 
policy has, therefore, been the direction of bank credit to certain sectors of priority such as 
agriculture, exports, small scale industry, infrastructure, housing, micro-credit institutions and 
self-help groups. An ongoing policy endeavour is enhancing and simplifying the access to 
credit with a view to securing the widest inclusion of society in the credit market (Table 3). 
Available empirical evidence covering the period September 1998–March 2004 suggests that 
the interest rate pass-through from changes in the policy rate was 0.61 and 0.42 for lending 
and deposit rates, respectively, ie, a reduction/increase of 100 basis points (bps) in the Bank 
Rate led to a reduction/increase of almost 40 bps in the banks’ deposit rates and 60 bps in 
their prime lending rate (Tables 4 & 5). Rolling regressions suggest some improvement in 
pass-through to lending rates and deposits. Thus, although pass-through is less than 
complete, there are signs of an increase in pass-through over time (RBI, 2004b). 
 
Table 4 
Outstanding term deposits of scheduled commercial 
banks by interest rate 
At the end of March 
Per cent to total deposits 
Interest 
Rate Slab  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
< 8%  10.8  11.2  11.5  13.3  16.8  16.9  25.0  53.7  74.0  86.4 
8–9%  2.4  5.2  4.8  6.1  6.5  10.5  22.6  16.4  9.9  5.8 
9–10%  4.5  7.1  6.4  9.0  14.3  16.1  19.8  12.0  7.3  3.1 
10–11%  15.2  14.1  13.7  17.7  20.9  23.9  17.3  10.5  5.1  2.5 
11–12%  13.9  14.3  16.3  20.2  19.2  17.9  9.1  4.5  2.3  1.1 
12–13%  23.4  20.9  22.3  19.2  13.9  9.1  4.3  2.3  1.1  0.5 
>13%  29.8  27.2  25.0  14.5  8.4  5.6  1.9  0.8  0.5  0.7 
Source: Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in India, various issues, Reserve Bank of India.
 




Outstanding loans of scheduled commercial  
banks by interest rate 
At the end of March 
Per cent to total loans 
Interest 
Rate Slab  1990  1995  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
<6%   2.7   2.3   1.1   1.0   0.3   0.2   0.2   0.1   0.1   0.4   0.4 
6–10%   6.8   2.1   0.5   0.4   3.7   1.0   0.6   3.2   5.3   13.6  19.5 
10–12%   4.8   2.3   1.4   2.3   3.3   7.9   17.0  24.5  22.9  16.1  17.5 
12–14%   21.4  10.6  10.7  13.2  20.3  26.8  28.6  22.5  25.1  25.7  22.4 
14–15%   4.4   6.7   10.9  14.9  9.7   11.5  12.6  14.1  19.4  16.2  16.6 
> 15%   59.8  76.0  75.4  68.2  62.7  52.6  41.0  35.6  27.1  28.0  23.6 
Source: As in Table 4. 
 
The improvement in the pass-through can be attributed to policy efforts to impart greater 
flexibility to the interest rate structure in the economy through various measures such as 
advising banks to: introduce a flexible interest rate option for new deposits; review their 
maximum spreads over the prime lending rate (PLR) and reduce them wherever they are 
unreasonably high; announce the maximum spread over PLR to the public along with the 
announcement of the PLR; and switch over to an “all cost” concept for borrowers by explicitly 
declaring the various charges such as processing and service charges (Table 6).
2 Besides, 
interest rates have emerged as a more potent instrument than before with the move towards 
floating, as against fixed rate products, under which the transmission is limited at the margin. 
                                                  
2   From October 18, 1994, banks have been free to fix the lending rates for loans above Rupees 200,000. Banks 
were required to obtain the approval of their respective Boards for the PLR which would be the minimum rate 
charged for loans above Rupees 2,00,000. In the interest of small borrowers, as well as to remove the 
disincentive for credit flow to such borrowers, the PLR was converted into a ceiling rate for loans up to Rupees 
2,00,000 in 1998–99. Sub-PLR lending was allowed in 2001–02 in keeping with international practice. For 
customers’ protection and meaningful competition, bank-wise quarterly data on the PLR, along with maximum 
and minimum lending rates, have been placed on the Reserve Bank’s website, starting from June 2002. To 
encourage greater transparency in loan pricing in the context of sticky behaviour of lending rates, the system 
of BPLR (ie, benchmark PLR) was introduced in 2003–04. Banks were advised to specify their BPLR taking 
into account (a) the actual cost of funds, (b) operating expenses and (c) a minimum margin to cover regulatory 
requirements of provisioning and capital charges, and profit margin. Whereas conceptually the BPLR should 
turn out to be a median lending rate, in practice the specification of the BPLR by banks has turned out to be 
sticky. Movements in the actual interest rate charged take place less transparently through changes in the 
proportion of loans above or below the announced BPLR. The share of sub-BPLR lending has, in recent 
times, increased to over 75 per cent, reflecting the overall decline in interest rates until recently. This has 
undermined the role of the BPLR as a reference rate, complicating the judgment on monetary transmission 




Lending rates of scheduled commercial banks in India 
Per cent 
Public sector banks  Foreign banks  Private sector banks 
 
Demand 
loans  Term loans  Demand 
loans  Term loans  Demand 
loans  Term loans 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Jun-02   12.75–14.00  12.75–14.00  13.00–14.75  13.00–15.50  13.75–16.00  14.00–16.00 
Sep-02   12.00–14.00  12.25–14.00  13.00–14.75  12.75–14.50  14.00–16.00  13.50–15.00 
Dec-02   11.85–14.00  12.25–14.00  12.00–14.75  11.70–13.63  13.50–15.75  13.50–15.00 
Mar-03   11.50–14.00  12.00–14.00  10.50–12.75  10.25–13.50  13.50–15.50  13.00–15.00 
Jun-03   11.50–14.00  11.50–14.00  10.00–14.00  9.73–13.00   13.00–15.00  12.50–14.75 
Sep-03   11.50–13.50  11.00–13.50  9.50–12.75   9.25–13.50   13.00–14.50  12.00–14.50 
Dec-03   11.50–13.00  11.00–13.25  7.75–13.65   9.00–13.00   12.50–14.50  11.50–14.50 
Mar-04   11.00–12.75  11.00–12.75  7.50–11.00   8.00–11.60   12.00–14.00  11.25–14.00 
Jun-04   10.50–12.50  10.75–12.75  6.50–11.50   7.25–10.95   11.50–13.75  11.00–14.00 
Sep-04   10.50–12.50  9.50–12.25   6.75–9.00   7.25–11.00   11.25–13.25  9.50–13.00 
Dec-04   9.00–12.50   8.38–12.13   7.25–9.00   7.38–10.95   10.00–13.00  9.25–13.00 
Mar-05   9.00–12.50   8.38–12.00   7.13–9.00   7.63–9.50   10.00–12.50  9.00–13.00 
Jun-05   8.00–12.13   8.00–11.88   7.75–9.00   7.50–9.50   10.00–12.75  9.00–13.00 
Sep-05   8.00–11.63   8.00–11.88   7.00–10.25   7.35–9.50   10.00–12.50  9.00–13.00 
Dec-05   8.00–11.63   8.00–11.63   7.00–9.50   7.20–9.50   10.00–13.00  9.25–13.00 
Mar-06   8.00–11.63   8.00–11.63   8.00–9.75   7.53–9.75   9.50–13.00   9.00–13.18 
Jun-06   8.00–11.25   8.00–12.00   7.63–9.75   7.53–9.75   9.75–13.50   9.23–13.75 
Sep-06   8.25–11.50   8.50–12.13   8.08–9.57   7.85–9.75   10.00–13.50  9.45–13.50 
Dec-06   8.00–11.88   8.50–12.00   8.05–10.00   8.00–9.50   10.00–13.13  9.23–12.63 
Note: Median lending rates in this table are the range within which at least 60 per cent of business is contracted. 
Source: Reserve Bank of India, available at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/lendingrate/home.html. 
 
In recent times, there has been some tendency to widen the net of administered interest 
rates to cover bank loans for agriculture. While such a tendency may not be an unlikely 
outcome given the predominance of publicly-owned financial intermediaries, it needs to be 
recognized that the current pricing system for bank loans appears less than satisfactory, 
particularly in respect of agriculture and small scale industries (SSI). Competition has moved 
the pricing of a significant proportion of loans far out of alignment with the BPLR and in a 
non-transparent manner. Thus, there is a public perception that banks’ risk assessment 
processes are less than appropriate and that there is underpricing of credit for corporates, 
while there could be overpricing of lending to agriculture and SSI. Therefore, the current 
practices on pricing of credit need to be revamped by banks through well structured, 
segment-wise analysis of costs at various stages of intermediation in the whole credit cycle. BIS Papers No 35  273
 
 
The Indian financial system appears to have responded favourably to reforms initiated in the 
early 1990s with relatively higher efficiency, competitiveness and resilience. This has 
enabled banks to increase their lending to the commercial sector. Non-food credit extended 
by scheduled commercial banks recorded an average annual growth of 26.4 per cent 
between 2002–03 and 2005–06, notably higher than that of 14.5 per cent recorded during 
the preceding four-year period (1998–99 to 2001–02) as well as the long-run average of 
17.8 per cent (1970–2006). Reflecting the growth in bank credit, the ratio of bank credit to 
GDP has also witnessed a sharp rise. The credit-GDP ratio, after moving in a narrow range 
of around 30 per cent between mid-1980s and late 1990s, started increasing from 2000–01 
onwards to 35 per cent during 2004–05 and further to 40 per cent during 2006–07. The 
stagnation in credit flow observed during the late 1990s was, in retrospect, partly caused by 
a reduction in demand on account of an increase in real interest rates, the cyclical down turn 
and the significant business restructuring that occurred during that period. The sharp 
expansion in bank credit in the past 4–5 years also reflects, in part, policy initiatives to 
improve the flow of credit to sectors like agriculture. While demand for agricultural and 
industrial credit has remained strong in the current cycle, increasingly, retail credit has 
emerged as the driver of growth. The strengthening of the banking system has thus worked 
towards financial widening and deepening. In the process, greater monetization and financial 
inclusion are extending the net of the formal financial system and, hence, enhancing the 
scope of monetary transmission. 
The increasing reach of formal finance has gradually expanded to cover larger segments of 
the population. The “demographic dividend” of a larger and younger labour force has meant 
that banks have been able to expand their loan portfolio rapidly, enabling consumers to 
satisfy their lifestyle aspirations at a relatively young age with an optimal combination of 
equity and debt to finance consumption and asset creation. In the process, interest has 
become a much more potent tool of monetary policy, affecting consumption and investment 
decisions of the population much more rapidly than was the case earlier. This is evident in 
the share of retail credit in total bank credit, increasing from around 6 per cent in March 1990 
to over 22 per cent in March 2005. A large part of this increase has taken place in the past 
5–6 years. In view of this growing share of household credit, it is likely that household 
consumption decisions, in the coming years, may be more strongly influenced by monetary 
policy decisions, with implications for the monetary transmission mechanism. Consequently, 
the monetary authority may need to contend increasingly with public opinion on monetary 
management, much more than hitherto, given the rising share of personal/household loans. 
In the context of large scale public ownership of banks, such pressures of public opinion 
would also manifest themselves into political pressures. 
In brief, there is increasing evidence that the bank credit and lending rate channels of 
monetary transmission are gaining in strength with the widening and deepening of the 
financial system and the progress towards greater price discovery. A number of constraints 
continue, however, to interfere with monetary transmission. First, the stipulation of priority 
sector lending of 40 per cent of net bank credit affects flexibility in sectoral credit allocation, 
even though there is no interest rate stipulation for the priority sector. Second, allocational 
flexibility is further constrained under the extant prescription of an SLR of 25 per cent of net 
demand and time liabilities (NDTL), although the relevant Act has now been amended to give 
the Reserve Bank flexibility to reduce this statutory liquidity ratio. Third, the system of BPLR 
for credit pricing has proved to be relatively sticky downward, and more so for specific 
sectors like agriculture and small scale industries (SSI). As the BPLR has ceased to be a 
reference rate, assessment of the efficacy of monetary transmission has become difficult. 
Fourth, the Government of India continues to own around 70 per cent of banks’ assets. While 
the Government, as a legitimate owner, is entitled to issue direction to public sector banks, 
such exercise by the Government introduces elements of uncertainty and market 
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III.4  Debt market channel 
While government debt management was one of the motivating factors for the setting up of 
central banks in many countries, currently the function, with its focus on lowering the cost of 
public debt, is often looked upon as constraining monetary management, particularly when 
compulsions of monetary policy amidst inflation expectations may necessitate a tighter 
monetary policy stance. Therefore, it is now widely believed that the two functions – 
monetary policy and public debt management – need to be conducted in a manner that 
ensures transparency and independence in monetary operations. The fuller development of 
financial markets, reasonable control over the fiscal deficit and necessary legislative changes 
are regarded as pre-conditions for separation of debt management from monetary 
management. The Reserve Bank currently performs the twin function of public debt and 
monetary management.  
“The logical question that follows is whether the experience of fiscal dominance 
over monetary policy would have been different if there had been separation of 
debt management from monetary management in India? Or, were we served 
better with both the functions residing in the Reserve Bank? What has really 
happened is that there was a significant change in thinking regarding overall 
economic policy during the early 1990s, arguing for a reduced direct role of the 
Government in the economy. A conscious view emerged in favour of fiscal 
stabilisation and reduction of fiscal deficits aimed at eliminating the dominance of 
fiscal policy over monetary policy through the prior practice of fiscal deficits being 
financed by automatic monetization. It is this overall economic policy 
transformation that has provided greater autonomy to monetary policy making in 
the 1990s. 
“The Indian economy has made considerable progress in developing its financial 
markets, especially the government securities market since 1991. Furthermore, 
fiscal dominance in monetary policy formulation has significantly reduced in 
recent years. With the onset of a fiscal consolidation process, withdrawal of the 
RBI from the primary market of Government securities and expected legislative 
changes permitting a reduction in the statutory minimum Statutory Liquidity Ratio, 
fiscal dominance would be further diluted. All of these changes took place despite 
the continuation of debt management by the Reserve Bank. Thus, one can argue 
that effective separation of monetary policy from debt management is more a 
consequence of overall economic policy thinking rather than adherence to a 
particular view on institutional arrangements” (Mohan, 2006b).  
The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, 2003 has set the stage for a 
front-loaded fiscal correction path for the Central Government. Similar enactments have also 
taken place in a number of States. As already mentioned, the FRBM Act, 2003 has 
prohibited the Reserve Bank from participating in primary issuance of government securities 
with effect from April 1, 2006, except under exceptional circumstances. In preparation, the 
institutional structures within the Reserve Bank have been modified to strengthen monetary 
operations with a view to moving towards functional separation between debt management 
and monetary operations. Accordingly, a new Financial Markets Department (FMD) has been 
constituted to undertake (i) monetary operations, (ii) regulation and development of money 
market instruments and (iii) monitoring of money, government securities and foreign 
exchange markets. The enactment of the FRBM Act has arguably strengthened monetary 
transmission through the debt market. It has also mitigated the possibility of conflict in 
monetary policy in order to contain the cost of Government borrowing. 
The auction-based issue of government debt according to a pre-announced calendar has 
enabled price discovery and liquidity in the market. A Negotiated Dealing System was 
introduced in February 2002 to facilitate electronic bidding, secondary market trading and 
settlement and to disseminate information on trades on a real-time basis. In the context of BIS Papers No 35  275
 
 
the Reserve Bank’s absence from primary auctions, a “when, as and if issued” market in 
Government securities has been allowed recently. 
Vibrant secondary market trading has helped to develop a yield curve and the term structure 
of interest rates. This has facilitated pricing of debt instruments in various market segments 
and, thereby, monetary transmission across maturity and financial instruments. While market 
yields, at times, turn out to be puzzling, particularly in the wake of global policy signaling as 
as well as in times of re-pricing of risks, the reverse repo rate set out by the Reserve Bank 
remains the overnight floor for the market. The falling interest rate scenario witnessed up to 
2003–04 and the comfortable liquidity position in the system had helped to bring down yields 
and the yield curve turned relatively flat. Long-term yields, however, continue to be 
impervious across the globe to subsequent reversal of the interest rate cycle, giving rise to a 
“conundrum” a la Greenspan (2005). In the Indian context, the transmission from shorter to 
longer end of the yield curve has been vacillating, linked, inter alia, to changes in monetary 
policy rates, inflation rates, international interest rates and, on other occasions, the SLR 
stipulation. With the increasing openness of the domestic economy, it appears that 
international economic developments are set to exert a greater influence on the domestic 
yield curve than before. Thus, even in the absence of fuller capital account convertibility, 
monetary transmission may need to contend with impulses that arise from international 
developments. Furthermore, the process of fiscal consolidation currently underway could 
potentially lead to a situation of excess demand for government securities in relation to their 
supply, which would, in turn, impact the shape of the yield curve and, thereby, impede 
monetary transmission. The stipulation for SLR could also undergo a change guided by 
prudential considerations, affecting, in the process, the demand for government securities 
and, thereby, the yield curve as banks remain invested with government securities for the 
purpose of SLR. Such developments, however, may not be in consonance with the monetary 
policy stance and hence, could get in the way of intended monetary transmission.  
While the government securities market is fairly well developed now, the corporate debt 
market remains to be developed for facilitating monetary signaling across various market 
segments. In the absence of a well developed corporate debt market, the demand for debt 
instruments has largely concentrated on government securities, with the attendant 
implications for the yield curve and, in turn, for monetary transmission. The secondary 
market for corporate debt has suffered from a lack of market making, resulting in poor 
liquidity. Corporates continue to prefer private placements to public issues for raising 
resources in view of ease of procedures and lower costs. There is a need for development of 
mortgage-backed securities, credit default swaps, bond insurance institutions for credit 
enhancement, abridgment of disclosure requirements for listed companies, rating 
requirements for unlisted companies, real time reporting of primary and secondary trading, 
retail access to bond market by non-profit institutions and small corporates and access to 
RTGS. A concerted effort is now being made to set up the institutional and technological 
structure that would enable the corporate debt market to operate. Furthermore, the on-going 
reforms in the area of social security coupled with the emergence of pension and provident 
funds are expected to increase the demand for long-term debt instruments. In the process, 
the investor base for government securities would be broadened, extending the monetary 
transmission across new players and participants. 
III.5  Exchange rate channel 
The foreign exchange market in India has acquired increasing depth with the transition to a 
market-determined exchange rate system in March 1993 and the subsequent gradual but 
significant relaxation of restrictions on various external transactions. Payment restrictions on 
all current account transactions were removed with the acceptance of the obligations of 
Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement in August 1994. While the rupee remains 
virtually convertible on the capital account for foreign nationals and non-resident Indians 
(NRIs), similar moves are on course for the domestic residents. Significant relaxations have 276  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
been allowed for capital outflows in the form of direct and portfolio investment, non-resident 
deposits, repatriation of assets and funds held abroad. Indian residents can now open 
foreign currency accounts with banks in India. 
The major initiatives taken to widen and deepen the Indian forex market and to link it with the 
global financial system have been: (i) freedom for banks to fix net overnight position limits 
and gap limits, initiate trading positions in the overseas markets, and use derivative products 
for asset-liability management; (ii) permission for authorised dealers (ADs) in foreign 
exchange to borrow abroad up to limits related to their capital base as a prudential measure; 
and (iii) freedom for corporates to hedge anticipated exposures, cancel and rebook 
forward contracts. The CCIL has commenced settlement of forex operations for inter-bank 
US Dollar/Indian rupee spot and forward trades from November 2002 and inter-bank 
US dollar/Indian rupee cash and tom trades from February 2004. 
The annual turnover in the foreign exchange market has increased more than threefold from 
US $ 1434 billion in 2000–01 to US $ 4413 billion in 2005–06 (Table 7). Inter-bank 
transactions continue to account for the bulk of the transactions in the forex market, albeit 
with a declining share over the years. The forward market segment (swaps plus forward) is 
also growing at a faster pace. Reflecting the build-up of forex reserves, the strong capital 
flows and the confidence in the Indian economy, forward premia have come down sharply 
from the peak reached in 1995–96. Under the market-determined exchange rate regime, the 
Indian rupee has exhibited two-way movements and the foreign exchange market has 
displayed stable conditions, as reflected in the annual coefficient of variation of 0.9–2.3 per 
cent during 2000–01 to 2005–06. The exchange rate policy of the Reserve Bank in recent 
years has been guided by the broad principles of careful monitoring and management of 
exchange rates with flexibility, without a fixed target or a pre-announced target or a band, 
coupled with the ability to intervene, if and when necessary. 
 
Table 7 




























Col 2 over 
Col 3 
Col 2 over 
Col 4 
1 2  3  4  5  6  7 
2000–01   1434    258    40    2.3    5.6    36 
2001–02   1487    237    51    1.4    6.3    29 
2002–03   1585    267    72    0.9    5.9    22 
2003–04    2141   362  107  1.6    5.9    20 
2004–05    2892   481  136  2.3    6.0    21 
2005–06    4413   657  145  1.5    6.7    30 
1  At end-March; CV: Coefficient of variation; BoP: Balance of payments. 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 
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Exchange rate flexibility, coupled with the gradual removal of capital controls, has widened 
the scope for monetary maneuverability, enabling transmission through exchange rates. In 
the event of interest rate arbitrage triggered by monetary policy action, foreign exchange 
inflows can tend to pick up until the interest rate parity is restored by exchange rate 
adjustments. An appreciating exchange rate, in turn, would have a dampening effect on 
aggregate demand, containing inflationary pressures. However, if large segments of 
economic agents lack adequate resilience to withstand volatility in currency and money 
markets, the option of exchange rate adjustments may not be available, partially or fully. 
Therefore, the central bank may need to carry out foreign exchange operations for stabilizing 
the market. In the process, the injection of liquidity into the system by the central bank would 
go against its policy stance and weaken monetary transmission. Thus, monetary 
management becomes complicated, and the monetary authority may need to undertake 
offsetting sterilization transactions in defence of monetary stability and intended 
transmission. In the Indian context, faced with similar circumstances, sterilization operations 
have been carried out from 2004 through issuance of government securities under the 
Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS). 
Available evidence suggests that exchange rate depreciation has the expected effect of 
raising domestic prices and the coefficient of exchange rate pass-through to domestic 
inflation ranges between 8–17 basis points (depending upon the measure of inflation), ie, a 
10 per cent depreciation of the Indian rupee (vis-a-vis the US dollar) would, other things 
remaining unchanged, increase consumer inflation by less than 1 percentage point and the 
GDP deflator by 1.7 percentage points. Rolling regressions suggest some decline in the 
exchange rate pass-through coefficient in recent years (RBI, 2004b). The coefficient on the 
exchange rate exhibits a declining trend, although the estimates turn out to be somewhat 
imprecise. This suggests a possible decline in exchange rate pass-through to domestic 
inflation. The decline in pass-through during the 1990s is consistent with the cross-country 
evidence. In India, inflation rates have declined significantly since the second half of the 
1990s and this could be one explanation for the lower pass-through. Another key factor that 
could have lowered the pass-through is the phased decline in tariffs as well as non-tariff 
barriers such as quotas. Average import duties are now less than one-third of what they were 
a decade ago. This steep reduction in tariffs could have easily allowed domestic producers to 
absorb some part of the exchange rate depreciation without any effect on their profitability. 
Another factor that could reduce the pass-through is related to globalization and 
“Walmartization”. The increased intensity of globalization and the commodification of many 
goods have perhaps reduced the pricing power of producers, particularly of low technology 
goods in developing countries, whereas the pricing power of large retailers like Walmart has 
risen. The decline in pass-through across a number of countries, as suggested by various 
studies, has implications for the efficacy of the exchange rate as an adjustment tool. The 
lower pass-through suggests that, in the new globalised economy, exchange rate 
adjustments as a means of correction of imbalances may have become less potent; if so, 
then the swing in exchange rates to correct emerging imbalances will have to be much larger 
than before, eventually bringing greater instability in their wake (Mohan, 2004). 
III.6  Communication and expectations channel 
In a market-oriented economy, well-informed market participants are expected to enable an 
improved functioning of the markets, and it is held that a central bank is in the best position 
to provide such useful information to the market participants. Whether providing information 
would result in shaping and managing expectations, and if so, whether it is desirable, remain 
unsettled issues. There are several dilemmas faced by central banks while designing an 
appropriate communications policy. First, what should be communicated and to what degree 
of disaggregation? The second set relates to: at what stage of evolution of internal thinking 
and debate should there be dissemination? The third set relates to the timing of 
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information and the possible ways in which it could be perceived. Thus, alleged incoherence 
or an element of ambiguity at times on the part of central bankers in explaining policies is as 
much a reflection of the complexity of the issues as it is of the differing perceptions of a 
variety of audiences to which the communication is addressed. It is essential to appreciate 
that communication policy is not merely about explaining or getting feedback on policy, but 
may include elements of influencing the policy direction itself. A central bank does this 
through several channels, including research publications and speeches (Reddy, 2001; 2006). 
It is recognised that credible communication and creative engagement with the market and 
economic agents have emerged as the critical channel of monetary transmission as against 
the traditional channels. For example, the US Federal Reserve, since 1994, appears to have 
been providing forward guidance, while the European Central Bank appears to be in the 
mould of keeping the markets informed rather than guiding it.  
With the widening and deepening of inter-linkages between various segments of financial 
markets, the Reserve Bank has adopted a consultative process for policy making in order to 
ensure timely and effective implementation of the measures. The Bank has taken a middle 
path of sharing its analysis in addition to providing information, but in no way guiding the 
market participants. However, in doing so, the RBI has the benefit of the process of two-way 
communication, of information as well as perceptions, between the market participants and 
the RBI. In the process, the Bank’s signaling/announcements are increasingly seen to have 
an influence on expectations formation in the market.  
The more complex the mandate for the central bank, the greater the need for communication 
(Mohan, 2005). The Reserve Bank of India clearly has complex objectives. Apart from 
pursuing monetary policy, financial stability is one of the overriding concerns of the RBI. 
Within the objective of monetary policy, both control of inflation and providing adequate credit 
to the productive sectors of the economy so as to foster growth are equally important. This 
apart, the Reserve Bank acts as a banking regulator, public debt manager, government debt 
market regulator and currency issuer. Faced with such multiple tasks and complex mandate, 
there is an utmost necessity of clearer communication on the part of the Reserve Bank.  
In general, for a central bank, there is a need for three kinds of communication: (a) policy 
measures, (b) reasons behind such policy measures and (c) analysis of the economy. The 
Reserve Bank is engaged with all three kinds of communication. In fact, by international 
standards the Reserve Bank has a fairly extensive and transparent communication system. 
Policy statements (quarterly since April 2005 onwards and bi-annual prior to this period) have 
traditionally communicated the Reserve Bank’s stance on monetary policy in the immediate 
future of six months to one year. The practice of attaching a review of macroeconomic 
developments to the quarterly reviews gives an expansive view of how the central bank sees 
the economy. In the bi-annual policy meetings with leading bankers, the Governor explains 
the rationale behind the measures at length. These policy meetings are not one-way traffic. 
Each banker present in the meeting interacts with the Governor to express his or her reaction 
to the policy announcement. After the policy announcement is over, the Governor addresses 
a press conference in the afternoon. The Deputy Governor in charge of monetary policy 
normally gives live interviews to all the major television channels on the same day. The 
Governor also gives interviews to print and electronic media over the next few days after the 
monetary policy announcement.  
Communication of policy also takes place through speeches of the Governor and Deputy 
Governors, and various periodic reports. A significant step towards transparency of monetary 
policy implementation is formation of various Technical Advisory Committees (TACs) in the 
Reserve Bank with representatives from market participants, other regulators and experts. In 
line with the international best practices and with a view to further strengthening the 
consultative process in monetary policy, the Reserve Bank, in July 2005, set up a Technical 
Advisory Committee on Monetary Policy (TACMP) with external experts in the areas of 
monetary economics, central banking, financial markets and public finance. The Committee 
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advises the Reserve Bank on the stance of monetary policy. The Committee has contributed 
to enriching the inputs and processes of monetary policy setting in India. Recognizing the 
importance of expectations in the conduct and formulation of monetary policy, the Reserve 
Bank has recently initiated surveys of business and inflation expectations.  
Finally, in the context of growing openness of the Indian economy and increasing integration 
with the rest of the world, global economic and financial developments – such as monetary 
policy decisions of the US Fed and other major economies and trends in international crude 
oil prices – are also shaping expectations. The Reserve Bank also takes such factors and 
expectations into account.
3 
The process of monetary policy formulation in India is now relatively transparent, consultative 
and participative with external orientation, and this has contributed to stabilizing expectations 
of market participants. Illustratively, an important element in coping with liquidity 
management has been the smoothing behaviour of the Reserve Bank and its communication 
strategy. In August 2004, the headline inflation rate shot up to 8.7 per cent, partly on account 
of rising global oil prices and partly due to a resurgence in manufacturing inflation. The 
turning of the interest rate cycle looked imminent. The issue was addressed through burden 
sharing by appropriate monetary and fiscal coordination and by preparing markets for a 
possible interest rate reversal. In measured and calibrated steps the monetary policy stance 
was changed and measures such as those on CRR and reverse repos were taken in a 
phased manner. Also, banks were allowed to transfer HFT (Held for Trading) and AFS 
(Available for Sale) securities to the HTM (Held to Maturity) category, thereby affording them 
some cushion against the possible interest rate shock. Markets were prepared with a careful 
communication on the stance of the monetary policy stating that the central bank would strive 
for provision of appropriate liquidity while placing equal emphasis on price stability. Monetary 
management thus succeeded in building credibility and keeping inflation expectations low.  
In brief, there has been a noteworthy improvement in the operational efficiency of monetary 
policy from the early 1990s. Financial sector reforms and the contemporaneous development 
of the money market, Government securities market and the foreign exchange market have 
strengthened monetary transmission by enabling more efficient price discovery, and 
improving allocative efficiency even as the RBI has undertaken developmental efforts to 
ensure the stability and smooth functioning of financial markets. The approach has been one 
of simultaneous movement on several fronts, graduated and calibrated, with an emphasis on 
institutional and infrastructural development and improvements in market microstructure. The 
pace of the reform was contingent upon putting in place appropriate systems and 
procedures, technologies and market practices. There has been close co-ordination between 
the Government and the RBI, as well as between different regulators, which helped in the 
orderly and smooth development of the financial markets in India. Markets have now grown 
in size, depth and activity, paving the way for flexible use of indirect instruments. The 
Reserve Bank has also engaged in refining the operating procedures and instruments as well 
as risk management systems, income recognition and provisioning norms, disclosure norms, 
accounting standards and insolvency in line with international best practices with a view to 
fostering the seamless integration of Indian financial markets with global markets. 
                                                  
3    Illustratively, the Reserve Bank in its Annual Policy Statement for 2006–07 (April 2006) stressed that: 
“Domestic macroeconomic and financial conditions support prospects of sustained growth momentum with 
stability in India. It is important to recognise, however, that there are risks to both growth and stability from 
domestic as well as global factors. At the current juncture, the balance of risks is tilted towards the global 
factors. The adverse consequences of further escalation of international crude prices and/or of disruptive 
unwinding of global imbalances are likely to be pervasive across economies, including India. Moreover, in a 
situation of generalised tightening of monetary policy, India cannot afford to stay out of step. It is necessary, 
therefore, to keep in view the dominance of domestic factors as in the past but to assign more weight to global 
factors than before while formulating the policy stance” (RBI, 2006). 280  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
IV. How  well  do  monetary  transmission channels work? 
Turning to an assessment of monetary policy transmission, it would be reasonable to assert 
that monetary policy has been largely successful in meeting its key objectives in the post-
reforms period. There has been a fall in inflation worldwide since the early 1990s, and in 
India since the late 1990s. Inflation has averaged close to 5 per cent per annum in the 
decade gone by, notably lower than the 8 per cent of the previous four decades (Chart 6). 
Structural reforms since the early 1990s coupled with improved monetary-fiscal interface and 
reforms in the Government securities market enabled better monetary management from the 
second half of the 1990s onwards. More importantly, the regime of low and stable inflation 
has, in turn, stabilised inflation expectations, and inflation tolerance in the economy has 
come down. It is encouraging to note that despite record high international crude oil prices, 
inflation remains low and inflation expectations also remain stable (Table 8). Since inflation 
expectations are a key determinant of the actual inflation outcome, and given the lags in 
monetary transmission, the Reserve Bank has been taking pre-emptive measures to keep 
inflation expectations stable. As discussed earlier, a number of instruments, both existing as 
well as new, were employed to modulate liquidity conditions to achieve the desired 
objectives. A number of other factors such as increased competition, productivity gains and 
strong corporate balance sheets have also contributed to this low and stable inflation 
environment, but it appears that calibrated monetary measures had a substantial role to play 
as well. 
Chart 6 
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In the context of the recent firming up of core as against headline inflation particularly in 
industrial countries, primarily on account of higher non-oil commodity prices, issues of proper 
measurement of inflation and inflationary pressures have attracted renewed debate. In 
particular, the debate involves the relevance of core inflation as a guide for the conduct of 
monetary policy vis-à-vis the use of headline inflation. In India, core inflation is not 
considered as relevant for several reasons, but mainly because the two major sources of 
supply shock, food and fuel, account for a large share of the index. Further, in the absence of 
a harmonized consumer price index for India, the use of core inflation based on wholesale 
prices may not be very meaningful. While the permanent component is judgmental, broad 
magnitudes could be perceived and articulated. Such an explanatory approach to headline 
and underlying inflation pressure in monetary policy has added credibility to the policy and 

























1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
WPI Inflation 
(end-Month)  6.5  5.5  1.6  6.5  4.6  5.1  4.1  6.6
1 
CPI-IW  4.8  2.5  5.2  4.1  3.5  4.2  4.9  6.9
2 
CPI-UNME  5.0  5.6  4.8  3.8  3.4  4.0  5.0  6.9
2 
CPI-AL  3.4  –2.0  3.0  4.9  2.5  2.4  5.3  9.5
3 
CPI-RL  …  –1.6  3.0  4.8  2.5  2.4  5.3  8.9
3 
…: Not available; IW: Industrial workers; UNME: Urban non-manual employees; AL: Agricultural labourers; 
RL: Rural labourers. 
1  As on February 10, 2007;    
2  As in December 2006;    
3  As in January 2007. 





Monetary policy and corporate performance:  
interest rate-related indicators 
Year  Growth rate in interest 
expenses (%) 
Debt service to total 
uses of funds ratio
1  Interest coverage ratio
2 
1990–91   16.2    22.4    1.9 
1991–92   28.7    28.3    1.9 
1992–93   21.6    24.4    1.6 
1993–94   3.1    20.9   2.0 
1994–95   8.1    27.2   2.4 
1995–96   25.0    21.5    2.7 
1996–97   25.7    18.7    2.1 
1997–98    12.5   8.1   1.9 
1998–99   11.1    17.6    1.6 
1999–00   6.7    17.6   1.7 
2000–01   7.1    14.0   1.7 
2001–02   –2.7    19.4    1.7 
2002–03    –11.2   8.9   2.3 
2003–04   –11.9    12.7    3.3 
2004–05   –5.8    21.8    4.6 
1    Represents the ratio of loans and advances plus interest accrued on loan to total uses of funds.     
2  Represents the ratio of gross profit (ie, earning before interest and taxes) to interest expenses. 
Source: The data is based on selected non-government, non-financial, public limited companies, collected by 
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How did monetary policy support the growth momentum in the economy? As inflation, along 
with inflation expectations, fell during the earlier period of this decade, policy interest rates 
were also brought down. Consequently, both nominal and real interest rates fell. The growth 
rate in interest expenses of the corporates declined consistently since 1995–96, from 
25.0 per cent to a negative of 5.8 per cent in 2004–05 (Table 9). Such decline in interest 
costs has significant implications for the improvement in bottom lines of the corporates. 
Various indicators pertaining to interest costs, which can throw light on the impact of interest 
costs on corporate sector profits, have turned positive in recent years. 
V.  What is needed to improve monetary transmission? 
While the changes in policy rates are quickly mirrored in the money market rates as well as 
in Government bond yields, lending and deposit rates of banks exhibit a degree of downward 
inflexibility. In this context, administered interest rates fixed by the Government on a number 
of small saving schemes and provident funds are of special relevance as they generally offer 
a rate higher than corresponding instruments available in the market as well as tax incentives 
(RBI, 2001; RBI, 2004a). As banks have to compete for funds with small saving schemes, 
the rates offered on long-term deposits mobilized by banks set the floor for lending rates at a 
level higher than would have obtained under competitive market conditions (Chart 7). In fact, 
this was observed to be a factor contributing to downward stickiness of lending rates, with 
implications for the effectiveness of monetary policy (Table 10). 
Chart 7 
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These small savings schemes administered by the Government through the wide reach of 
post offices, and some through commercial banks, give small savers access to tax savings 
instruments that are seen as safe and stable. Benchmarking these administered interest 
rates to market-determined rates has been proposed from time to time. Whereas some 
rationalization in such schemes has taken place, further progress in this direction will depend 
on the provision of better social security and pension systems, and perhaps easier access to 
marketable sovereign instruments (Mohan, 2006c). 




Small savings and bank deposits 

















as % of Bank 
deposits 
1 2  3  4  5  6 
1991–92    9.95   586   9.1    2,308    25.4 
1992–93    9.48   609   9.6    2,686    22.7 
1993–94    12.21   677   8.7    3,151    21.5 
1994–95    13.20   833   7.0    3,869    21.5 
1995–96    11.33   937   8.5    4,338    21.6 
1996–97   13.03   1,061    9.4    5,056    21.0 
1997–98   11.92   1,268    8.8    5,985    21.2 
1998–99   10.34   1,553    8.9    7,140    21.7 
1999–00   11.50   1,875    8.6    8,133    23.1 
2000–01   11.60   2,251    8.1    8,201    27.4 
2001–02   11.61   2,629    9.6    9,503    27.7 
2002–03   11.56   3,138    8.7    10,809    29.0 
2003–04   10.88   3,758    6.5    12,794    29.4 
2004–05   9.37    4,577    6.2    14,487   31.6 
2005–06   8.91    5,246      17,444   30.1 
Source: Annual Report and Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, various issues, Reserve Bank of 
India.  
 
In consonance with the objective of enhancing the efficiency and productivity of banks 
through greater competition – from new private sector banks and the entry and expansion of 
several foreign banks – there has been a consistent decline in the share of public sector 
banks in total assets of commercial banks. Notwithstanding such transformation, public 
sector banks still account for over 70 per cent of assets and income of commercial banks. 
While the public sector banks have responded well to the new challenges of competition, this 
very public sector character does influence their operational flexibility and decision making 
and, hence, interferes, on occasions, with the transmission of monetary policy impulses. 
Similar influence on monetary transmission is exerted by the priority sector directives in 
terms of allocation of 40 per cent of credit for specified sectors. The impact is, however, very 
limited now with the deregulation of lending rates and the rationalization of the sectors for 
priority credit allocation. 284  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
VI. Summing  up 
The brief survey of monetary policy transmission in India suggests that monetary policy 
impulses impact on output and prices through interest rates and exchange rate movements 
in addition to the traditional monetary and credit aggregates. It is necessary, however, to take 
note of a few caveats. First, the transmission lags are surrounded by a great deal of 
uncertainty. In view of the ongoing structural changes in the real sector as well as financial 
innovations, the precise lags may differ in each business cycle. Second, the period was also 
marked by heightened volatility in the international economy, including developments such 
as the series of financial crises beginning with the Asian crisis. Third, the period under study 
has been marked by sharp reductions in customs duties and increasing trade openness, 
which could have impacted the transmission process. The 1990s were also witness to global 
disinflation. Overall, the period has been one of substantial ongoing changes in various 
spheres of the Indian economy as well as in its external environment. Fourth, the period of 
study has been characterized by significant shifts in the monetary policy operating framework 
from a monetary-targeting framework to a multiple indicator approach. Fifth, the size of 
interest rate pass-through has increased in recent years, with implications for transmission. 
Finally, empirical investigation is constrained by the use of industrial production as a 
measure of output in the absence of a reasonably long time series on quarterly GDP of the 
economy. In view of the significant structural shifts towards the services sector and the inter-
linkages between agriculture, industry and services, the results of these empirical exercises 
should be considered tentative and need to be ratified with a comprehensive measure of 
output, as well as by considering alternative techniques. 
On the whole, the Indian experience highlights the need for emerging market economies to 
allow greater flexibility in exchange rates but the authorities can also benefit from the 
capacity to intervene in foreign exchange markets in view of the volatility observed in 
international capital flows. Therefore, there is a need to maintain an adequate level of foreign 
exchange reserves and this in turn both enables and constrains the conduct of monetary 
policy. A key lesson is that flexibility and pragmatism are required in the management of the 
exchange rate and monetary policy in developing countries rather than adherence to strict 





Reforms in the monetary policy framework 
Objectives 
•  Twin objectives of “maintaining price stability” and “ensuring availability of adequate 
credit to productive sectors of the economy to support growth” continue to govern 
the stance of monetary policy, although the relative emphasis on these objectives 
has varied depending on the importance of maintaining an appropriate balance. 
•  Reflecting the increasing development of the financial market and greater 
liberalization, the use of broad money as an intermediate target has been de-
emphasised and a multiple indicator approach has been adopted. 
•  Emphasis has been put on development of multiple instruments to transmit liquidity 
and interest rate signals in the short-term in a flexible and bi-directional manner. 
•  Increase of the interlinkage between various segments of the financial market 
including money, government security and forex markets. 
Instruments 
•  Move from direct instruments (such as administered interest rates, reserve 
requirements, selective credit control) to indirect instruments (such as open market 
operations, purchase and repurchase of government securities) for the conduct of 
monetary policy. 
•  Introduction of Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF), which operates through repo and 
reverse repo auctions, effectively providing a corridor for short-term interest rates. 
LAF has emerged both as the tool for liquidity management and as a signalling 
devise for interest rates in the overnight market. 
•  Use of open market operations to deal with overall market liquidity situation, 
especially those emanating from capital flows. 
•  Introduction of Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS) as an additional instrument to 
deal with enduring capital inflows without affecting the short-term liquidity 
management role of LAF. 
Developmental measures 
•  Discontinuation of automatic monetization through an agreement between the 
Government and the Reserve Bank. Rationalization of Treasury Bill market. 
Introduction of delivery versus payment system and deepening of inter-bank repo 
market. 
•  Introduction of Primary Dealers in the government securities market to play the role 
of market maker. 
•  Amendment of Securities Contracts Regulation Act (SCRA), to create the regulatory 
framework. 286  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
•  Deepening of the government securities market by making the interest rates on such 
securities market-related. Introduction of auctions of government securities. 
Development of a risk-free credible yield curve in the government securities market 
as a benchmark for related markets. 
•  Development of a pure inter-bank call money market. Non-bank participants to 
participate in other money market instruments.  
•  Introduction of automated screen-based trading in government securities through 
Negotiated Dealing System (NDS). Setting up of risk-free payments and system in 
government securities through Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL). Phased 
introduction of a Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System. 
•  Deepening of the forex market and increased autonomy of Authorised Dealers. 
Institutional measures 
•  Setting up of Technical Advisory Committee on Monetary Policy with outside experts 
to review macroeconomic and monetary developments and advise the Reserve 
Bank on the stance of monetary policy. 
•  Creation of a separate Financial Market Department within the RBI. 




Money market instruments for liquidity management 
The Reserve Bank has been making efforts to develop a repo market outside the LAF for 
bank and non-bank participants, so as to provide a stable collateralised funding alternative 
with a view to promoting smooth transformation of the call/notice money market into a pure 
inter-bank market and for deepening the underlying Government securities market. Thus, the 
following new instruments have been introduced. 
Collateralised borrowing and lending obligation (CBLO) 
•  Developed by the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL) and introduced on 
January 20, 2003, it is a discounted instrument available in electronic book entry 
form for the maturity period ranging from one day to ninety days (can be made 
available up to one year as per RBI guidelines).  
•  In order to enable the market participants to borrow and lend funds, CCIL provides 
the Dealing System through the Indian Financial Network (INFINET), a closed user 
group for the Members of the Negotiated Dealing System (NDS) who maintain a 
current account with the RBI, and through the Internet for other entities who do not 
maintain a current account with the RBI. 
•  Membership (including Associate Membership) of the CBLO segment is extended to 
banks, financial institutions, insurance companies, mutual funds, primary dealers, 
NBFCs, non-Government provident funds, corporates, etc. 
•  Eligible securities are Central Government securities including Treasury Bills.  
•  Borrowing limits for members are fixed by the CCIL at the beginning of the day 
taking into account the securities deposited by borrowers in their CSGL account with 
CCIL. The securities are subjected to the necessary hair-cut after marking them to 
market.  
•  The auction market is available only to NDS Members for overnight borrowing and 
settlement on a T + 0 basis. At the end of the auction market session, CCIL initiates 
auction matching based on the uniform yield principle.  
•  CCIL assumes the role of the central counterparty through the process of novation 
and guarantees settlement of transactions in CBLO. 
•  Automated value-free transfer of securities between market participants and the 
CCIL was introduced during 2004–05. 
•  Members can reckon unencumbered securities for SLR calculation purposes. 
•  The operations in CBLO are exempted from cash reserve requirements (CRR). 
Market repo 
•  To broaden the repo market, the Reserve Bank enabled non-banking financial 
companies, mutual funds, housing finance companies and insurance companies not 
holding SGL accounts to undertake repo transactions with effect from March 3, 2003. 288  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
These entities were permitted to access the repo market through their “gilt accounts” 
maintained with the custodians.  
•  Subsequently, non-scheduled urban co-operative banks and listed companies with 
gilt accounts with scheduled commercial banks were allowed to participate.  
•  Necessary precautions were built into the system to ensure delivery versus payment 
(DvP) and transparency, while restricting the repos to Government securities only.  
•  Rollover of repo transactions in Government securities was facilitated with the 
enabling of the DvP III mode of settlement in Government securities, which involves 
settlement of securities and funds on a net basis, effective April 2, 2004. This 
provided significant flexibility to market participants in managing their collateral. 
Some assessments 
•  CBLO and market repo helped in aligning short-term money market rates to the 
LAF corridor. 
•  Mutual funds and insurance companies are generally the main supplier of funds 
while banks, primary dealers and corporates are the major borrowers in the repo 




Reforms in government securities  
market institutional measures 
•  Administered interest rates on government securities were replaced by an auction 
system for price discovery.  
•  Automatic monetization of the fiscal deficit through the issue of ad hoc Treasury Bills 
was phased out.  
•  Primary dealers (PD) were introduced as market makers in the government 
securities market.  
•  To ensure transparency in the trading of government securities, delivery versus 
payment (DvP) settlement was introduced.  
•  Repurchase agreements (repos) were introduced as a tool for short-term liquidity 
adjustment. Subsequently, the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) was introduced. 
•  LAF operates through repo and reverse repo auctions and provides a corridor for 
short-term interest rates. LAF has emerged both as the tool for liquidity 
management and as a signalling device for interest rates in the overnight market. 
The Second LAF (SLAF) was introduced in November 2005.  
•  A Market Stabilisation Scheme (MSS) has been introduced, which has expanded 
the instruments available to the Reserve Bank for managing the enduring surplus 
liquidity in the system. 
•  Effective April 1, 2006, RBI has withdrawn from participating in primary market 
auctions of Government paper. 
•  Banks have been permitted to undertake primary dealer business, while primary 
dealers are being allowed to diversify their business.  
•  Short sales in Government securities are being permitted in a calibrated manner, 
while guidelines for the “when issued” market have been issued recently. 
Increase in instruments in the government securities market 
•  A 91-day Treasury Bill was introduced for managing liquidity and benchmarking. 
Zero Coupon Bonds, Floating Rate Bonds, and Capital Indexed Bonds were issued 
and exchange traded interest rate futures were introduced. OTC interest rate 
derivatives like IRS/FRAs were introduced. 
•  Outright sales of Central Government dated securities that are not owned have been 
permitted, subject to them being covered by outright purchases from the secondary 
market within the same trading day subject to certain conditions. 
•  Repo status has been granted to State Government securities in order to improve 




•  Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) were allowed to invest in government securities 
subject to certain limits.  
•  Introduction of automated screen-based trading in government securities through 
Negotiated Dealing System (NDS).  
•  Setting up of a risk-free payment and settlement system in government securities 
through the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL).  
•  Phased introduction of Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS).  
•  Introduction of trading in Government securities on stock exchanges for promoting 
retailing in such securities, permitting non-banks to participate in the repo market. 




Reforms in the foreign exchange market 
Exchange rate regime 
•  Evolution of the exchange rate regime from a single-currency fixed exchange rate 
system to fixing the value of rupee against a basket of currencies and further to a 
market-determined floating exchange rate regime.  
•  Adoption of convertibility of the rupee for current account transactions with 
acceptance of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. De facto full 
capital account convertibility for non-residents and calibrated liberalization of 
transactions undertaken for capital account purposes in the case of residents. 
Institutional framework 
•  Replacement of the earlier Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1973 by the 
market friendly Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. Delegation of 
considerable powers by the RBI to authorised dealers to release foreign exchange 
for a variety of purposes. 
Increase in instruments in the foreign exchange market 
•  Development of rupee-foreign currency swap market. 
•  Introduction of additional hedging instruments, such as foreign currency-rupee 
options. Authorised dealers permitted to use innovative products like cross-currency 
options, interest rate swaps (IRS) and currency swaps, caps/collars and forward rate 
agreements (FRAs) in the international forex market. 
Liberalization measures 
•  Authorised dealers permitted to initiate trading positions, borrow and invest in the 
overseas market subject to certain specifications and ratification by the respective 
banks’ boards. Banks are also permitted to fix interest rates on non-resident 
deposits, subject to certain specifications, use derivative products for asset-liability 
management and fix overnight open position limits and gap limits in the foreign 
exchange market, subject to ratification by the RBI. 
•  Permission for various participants in the foreign exchange market, including 
exporters, Indians investing abroad, FIIs, to avail themselves forward cover and 
enter into swap transactions without any limit subject to genuine underlying 
exposure. 
•  FIIs and NRIs permitted to trade in exchange-traded derivative contracts subject to 
certain conditions. 292  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
•  Foreign exchange earners permitted to retain up to 100 per cent of their foreign 
exchange earnings in their Exchange Earners’ Foreign Currency accounts. 
Residents are permitted to remit up to US$50,000 per financial year. 
•  Authorised dealer banks may borrow funds from their overseas branches and 
correspondent banks (including borrowing for export credit, external commercial 
borrowings (ECBs) and overdrafts from their Head Office/Nostro account) up to a 
limit of 50 per cent of their unimpaired Tier I capital or US$10 million, whichever is 
higher. 
•  Borrowers eligible for accessing ECBs can obtain an additional US$250 million with 
average maturity of more than 10 years under the approval route. Prepayment of 
ECB up to US$300 million without prior approval of the Reserve Bank. 
•  The existing limit of US$2 billion on investments in Government securities by 
foreign institutional investors (FIIs) to be enhanced in phases to US$32 billion by 
March 31, 2007. 
•  The extant ceiling of overseas investment by mutual funds of US$ 2billion is 
enhanced to US$3 billion. 
•  Importers to be permitted to book forward contracts for the customs duty component 
of imports. 
•  FIIs to be allowed to rebook a part of the cancelled forward contracts. 
•  Forward contracts booked by exporters and importers in excess of 50 per cent of the 
eligible limit to be on deliverable basis and cannot be cancelled. 
•  Authorised dealer banks to be permitted to issue guarantees/letters of credit for 
import of services up to US$100,000 for securing a direct contractual liability arising 
out of a contract between a resident and a non-resident. 
•  Lock-in period for sale proceeds of the immovable property credited to the NRO 
account to be eliminated, provided the amount being remitted in any financial year 




Reforms in the banking sector 
Competition enhancing measures 
•  Granting of operational autonomy to public sector banks, reduction of public 
ownership in public sector banks by allowing them to raise capital from the equity 
market up to 49 per cent of paid-up capital.  
•  Transparent norms for entry of Indian private sector, foreign and joint-venture banks 
and insurance companies, permission for foreign investment in the financial sector 
in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as portfolio investment, 
permission for banks to diversify product portfolio and business activities.  
•  Roadmap for presence of foreign banks and guidelines for mergers and 
amalgamation of private sector banks and banks and NBFCs.  
•  Guidelines on ownership and governance in private sector banks.  
Measures enhancing role of market forces 
•  Sharp reduction in pre-emption through reserve requirements, market-determined 
pricing for government securities, removal of administered interest rates with a few 
exceptions, and enhanced transparency and disclosure norms to facilitate market 
discipline.  
•  Introduction of a pure inter-bank call money market, auction-based repos-reverse 
repos for short-term liquidity management, facilitation of an improved payment and 
settlement mechanism.  
•  Significant advance in dematerialization; markets for securitised assets are being 
developed. 
Prudential measures 
•  Introduction and phased implementation of international best practices and norms 
on risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements, accounting, income recognition, 
provisioning and exposure.  
•  Measures to strengthen risk management through recognition of different 
components of risk, assignment of risk weights to various asset classes, norms on 
connected lending, risk concentration, application of marked-to-market principle for 
investment portfolio and limits on deployment of funds in sensitive activities.  
•  “Know Your Customer” and “Anti-Money Laundering” guidelines, roadmap for Basel 
II, introduction of capital charge for market risk, higher graded provisioning for 
NPAs, guidelines for ownership and governance, securitization and debt 
restructuring mechanisms norms, etc. 294  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
Institutional and legal measures 
•  Setting up of Lok Adalats (people’s courts), debt recovery tribunals, asset 
reconstruction companies, settlement advisory committees, corporate debt 
restructuring mechanisms, etc. for quicker recovery/restructuring.  
•  Promulgation of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and 
Enforcement of Securities Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 and its subsequent 
amendment to ensure creditor rights.  
•  Setting up of Credit Information Bureau of India Limited (CIBIL) for information 
sharing on defaulters as well as other borrowers.  
•  Setting up of Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL) to act as central 
counterparty for facilitating transactions through the payment and settlement system 
relating to fixed income securities and money market instruments. 
Supervisory measures 
•  Establishment of the Board for Financial Supervision as the supreme supervisory 
authority for commercial banks, financial institutions and non-banking financial 
companies.  
•  Introduction of the CAMELS supervisory rating system, move towards risk-based 
supervision, consolidated supervision of financial conglomerates, strengthening of 
off-site surveillance through control returns. 
•  Recasting of the role of statutory auditors, increased internal control through 
strengthening of internal audit.  
•  Strengthening corporate governance, enhanced due diligence on important 
shareholders, fit and proper tests for directors.  
Technology-related measures 
•  Setting up of INFINET as the communication backbone for the financial sector; 
introduction of Negotiated Dealing System (NDS) for screen-based trading in 
Government securities and Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) System. 




Liquidity adjustment facility 
•  As part of the financial sector reforms launched in mid-1991, India began to move 
away from direct instruments of monetary control to indirect ones. A transition of this 
kind involves considerable efforts to develop markets, institutions and practices. In 
order to facilitate such transition, India developed a Liquidity Adjustment Facility 
(LAF) in phases considering country-specific features of the Indian financial system. 
LAF is based on repo/reverse repo operations by the central bank. 
•  In 1998 the Committee on Banking Sector Reforms (Narasimham Committee II) 
recommended the introduction of a Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) under which 
the Reserve Bank would conduct auctions periodically, if not necessarily daily. The 
Reserve Bank could reset its repo and reverse repo rates, which would in a sense 
provide a reasonable corridor for the call money market. In pursuance of these 
recommendations, a major change in the operating procedure became possible in 
April 1999 through the introduction of an Interim Liquidity Adjustment Facility (ILAF), 
under which repos and reverse repos were formalised. With the introduction of ILAF, 
the general refinance facility was withdrawn and replaced by a collateralised lending 
facility (CLF) up to 0.25 per cent of the fortnightly average outstanding of aggregate 
deposits in 1997–98 for two weeks at the bank rate. An additional collateralised 
lending facility (ACLF) for an equivalent amount of CLF was made available at the 
Bank Rate plus 2 per cent. CLF and ACLF taken out for periods beyond two weeks 
were subjected to a penalty rate of 2 per cent for an additional two-week period. 
Export credit refinance for scheduled commercial banks was retained and continued 
to be provided at the bank rate. Liquidity support to PDs against collateral of 
Government securities at the bank rate was also provided for. ILAF was expected to 
promote money market stability and ensure that the interest rates moved within a 
reasonable range. 
•  The transition from ILAF to a full-fledged LAF began in June 2000 and was 
undertaken in three stages. In the first stage, beginning June 5, 2000, LAF was 
formally introduced and the Additional CLF and level II support to PDs was replaced 
by variable rate repo auctions with same day settlement. In the second stage, 
beginning May 2001, CLF and level I liquidity support for banks and PDs was also 
replaced by variable rate repo auctions. Some minimum liquidity support to PDs was 
continued but at an interest rate linked to the variable rate in the daily repo auctions 
as determined by the RBI from time to time. In April 2003, the multiplicity of rates at 
which liquidity was being absorbed/injected under the back-stop facility was 
rationalised and the back-stop interest rate was fixed at the reverse repo cut-off rate 
at the regular LAF auctions on that day. If there was no reverse repo in the LAF 
auctions, the back-stop rate was fixed at 2.0 percentage points above the repo cut-
off rate. It was also announced that on days when no repo/reverse repo bids were 
received/accepted, the back-stop rate would be decided by the Reserve Bank on an 
ad-hoc basis. A revised LAF scheme was operationalised effective March 29, 2004, 
under which the reverse repo rate was reduced to 6.0 per cent and aligned with the 
bank rate. The normal facility and the backstop facility were merged into a single 
facility and made available at a single rate. The third stage of full-fledged LAF had 
begun with the full computerization of the Public Debt Office (PDO), and the 
introduction of RTGS marked a big step forward in this phase. Repo operations 
today are mainly through electronic transfers. Fixed rate auctions have been 
reintroduced since April 2004. The possibility of operating LAF at different times on 
the same day is now close to being materialised. In that sense we have very nearly 
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•  With the introduction of the Second LAF (SLAF) from November 28, 2005 market 
participants now have a second window to fine-tune the management of liquidity. In 
the past, LAF operations were conducted between 9.30 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. SLAF 
is conducted by receiving bids between 3.00 p.m. and 3.45 p.m. The salient features 
of SLAF are the same as those of LAF and the settlement for both is conducted 
separately and on a gross basis. The introduction of LAF has been a gradual 
process and the Indian experience shows that a phased rather than big bang 
approach is required for reforms in the financial sector and in monetary 
management.  
References: 
Reserve Bank of India (1999), Repurchase Agreements (Repos): Report of the Sub-group of 
the Technical Advisory Committee on Government Securities Market, April, 1999, Mumbai.  
——— (2003), Report of the Internal Group on Liquidity Adjustment Facility, December 2003, 




Market stabilisation scheme (MSS) 
•  The money markets have operated in liquidity surplus mode since 2002 due to large 
capital inflows and current account surplus. The initial burden of sterilization was 
borne by the outright transaction of dated securities and T-bills. However, due to the 
depletion in stock of government securities, the burden of liquidity adjustment shifted 
to LAF, which is essentially a tool for marginal liquidity adjustment. Keeping in view 
the objective of absorbing the liquidity of enduring nature using instruments other 
than LAF, the Reserve Bank appointed a Working Group on Instruments of 
Sterilisation (Chairperson: Smt Usha Thorat). The Group recommended the 
issuance of T-bills and dated securities under the Market Stabilisation Scheme 
(MSS), with the proceeds of MSS being held by the Government in a separate 
identifiable cash account maintained and operated by the RBI. The amounts 
credited into the MSS Account would be appropriated only for the purpose of 
redemption and/or buy back of the Treasury Bills and/or dated securities issued 
under the MSS. In pursuance of the recommendation, the Government of India and 
RBI signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on March 25, 2004. As part of 
the MoU, the scheme was made operational in April 2004. It was agreed that the 
Government would issue Treasury Bills and/or dated securities under the MSS in 
addition to the normal borrowing requirements, for absorbing liquidity from the 
system. These securities would be issued by way of auctions by the Reserve Bank 
and the instruments would have all the attributes of existing T-bills and dated 
securities. They were to be serviced like any other marketable government 
securities. MSS securities are treated as eligible securities for the Statutory Liquidity 
Ratio (SLR), repos and the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF). 
•  The proceeds of the MSS are held by the Government in a separate identifiable 
cash account maintained and operated by the Reserve Bank. The amount held in 
this account is appropriated only for the purpose of redemption and/or buyback of 
the Treasury Bills and/or dated securities issued under the MSS. The payments for 
interest and discount on MSS securities are not made from the MSS account. The 
receipts due to premium and/or accrued interest are also not credited to the MSS 
account. Such receipts and payments towards interest, premium and discount are 
shown in the budget and other related documents as distinct components under 
separate sub-headings. Thus, they only have a marginal impact on the revenue and 
fiscal balances of the Government to the extent of interest payment on the 
outstanding under the MSS. 
•  For mopping up enduring surplus liquidity, a policy choice exists between the central 
bank issuing its own securities or the Government issuing additional securities. A 
large number of countries, such as Chile, China, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Sri Lanka, Tawian and Thailand, have 
issued central bank securities. However, central banks of many of these countries 
faced deterioration in their balance sheets. As such, there are merits in issuing 
sterilization bonds on the government account. This is more so in the case of an 
already well established government debt market, where the issuance of new 
central bank bills of overlapping maturity could cause considerable confusion and 
possible market segmentation which could obfuscate the yield curve, reduce liquidity 
of the instruments and make operations that much more difficult. 
•  MSS has considerably strengthened the Reserve Bank’s ability to conduct exchange 
rate and monetary management operations. It has allowed absorption of surplus 
liquidity by instruments of short-term (91-day, 182-day and 364-day T-bills) and 298  BIS Papers No 35
 
 
medium-term (dated Government securities) maturity. Generally, the preference has 
been for the short-term instruments. This has given the monetary authorities a 
greater degree of freedom in liquidity management during transitions in the liquidity 
situation. 
Reference: 
Reserve Bank of India (2003), Report of the Working Group on Instruments of Sterlisation, 




Liquidity management during IMD redemption 
•  The India Millennium Deposits (IMDs) were foreign currency denominated deposits 
issued by the State Bank of India in 2000, on the advice of the Government of India. 
It mobilised a sum of USD 5.5 billion for a tenor of five years. IMD carried coupons 
of 8.50 per cent, 7.85 per cent and 6.85 per cent on US dollar, Pound Sterling and 
Euro denominated deposits respectively. IMD subscription was limited to non-
resident Indians, persons of Indian origin and overseas corporate bodies. The 
interest income earned on IMD was exempted from tax and there was provision for 
premature encashment after six months only in non-repatriable Indian rupees. 
These IMDs matured on December 28–29, 2005 and the large sums involved 
presented a challenge for liquidity management. 
•  Liquidity management in the face of IMD redemptions was carried out to contain 
disequilibrium while retaining a monetary policy stance with a medium-term 
objective. Outflows on account of the redemptions were met by smoothing 
arrangements worked out for that purpose. During December 27–29, 2005, the RBI 
sold foreign exchange out of its foreign exchange reserves to the State Bank of 
India (SBI) totaling nearly US$ 7.1 billion, which in rupee equivalent terms was 
about Rs.32,000 crore. SBI, for its part, had built up the necessary rupee resources 
to meet the obligations. Temporary tightness in liquidity was met by releasing 
liquidity through the repo window (including the second LAF), averaging about 
Rs.23,000 crore per day in the last week of December, coinciding with the IMD 
redemptions, outflows due to advance tax payments and the continued surge in 
credit offtake. The second LAF window made available since November 28, 2005 
provided an additional opportunity for market participants to fine tune their liquidity 
management. The smooth redemption of the IMD liability of this size, bunched at a 
point of time, reflects the growing maturity of the financial markets and the strength 
of the liquidity management system that has been put in place. Short-term money 
market rates eased remarkably in the first week of January 2006, reflecting smooth 
redemptions of IMDs, but firmed up in the second week, reflecting pressures 
emanating from scheduled auctions of Government securities. 




Prudential guidelines impacting  
monetary transmission in India 
The Reserve Bank has issued several prudential capital requirement and supervisory 
guidelines which could have an impact on the transmission of monetary policy in India. 
These include:  
•  For ensuring a smooth transition to Basel II norms, banks were required to maintain 
a capital charge for market risk on their trading book exposures (including 
derivatives) by March 31, 2005 and on the securities included under the Available 
for Sale category by March 31, 2006. 
•  Banks in India have been advised to adopt the Standardised Approach for credit risk 
and Basic Indicator Approach for operational risk under the New Capital Adequacy 
Framework with effect from March 31, 2008.  
•  Effective March 31, 2002, banks were permitted to have single or group borrower 
credit exposure up to 15 per cent and 40 per cent of their capital funds (Tier I and 
Tier II capital) respectively, with an additional allowance of 5 per cent and 10 per 
cent of their capital funds for the infrastructure sector. In May 2004 banks were 
permitted to consider enhancement of their exposure to the borrower up to a further 
5 per cent of capital funds, subject to the banks disclosing this in their annual 
reports.  
•  Banks’ aggregate exposure to the capital market was restricted to 40 per cent of 
their net worth on a solo and consolidated basis. The consolidated direct capital 
market exposure was restricted to 20 per cent of banks’ consolidated net worth.  
•  The RBI issued a “Guidance Note on Management of Operational Risk” in October 
2005 to enable the banks to have a smooth transition to the New Capital Adequacy 
Framework. Banks using the Basic Indicator Approach were encouraged to comply 
with “Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of Operational Risk” 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in February 2003. 
•  In order to encourage banks’ early compliance with the guidelines for maintenance 
of a capital charge for market risks, banks were advised in April 2005 that banks 
which have maintained capital of at least 9 per cent of the risk-weighted assets for 
both credit risk and market risks for both the Held For Trading (HFT) and the 
Available For Sale (AFS) categories may treat the balance in excess of 5 per cent of 
securities included under HFT and AFS categories, in the Investment Fluctuation 
Reserves (IFR), as Tier I capital.  
•  In view of strong growth of housing and consumer credit, risk containment measures 
were put in place and the risk weights were increased in October 2004 from 50 per 
cent to 75 per cent in the case of housing loans and from 100 per cent to 125 per 
cent in the case of consumer credit including personal loans and credit cards. The risk 
weight on banks’ exposure to commercial real estate was increased from 100 per cent 
to 125 per cent in July 2005 and further to 150 per cent in April 2006. 
•  It was decided in April 2006 that bank’s total exposure to venture capital funds will 
form a part of their capital market exposure and banks should, henceforth, assign a 
higher risk weight of 150 per cent to these exposures.  
•  Taking into account the trends in credit growth, the general provisioning requirement 
for “standard advances” was increased in October 2005 from 0.25 per cent to 
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exempted from the additional provisioning requirement. In April 2006, the RBI further 
increased the general provisioning requirement on standard advances in specific 
sectors, ie, personal loans, loans and advances qualifying as capital market 
exposures, residential housing loans beyond Rs.20 lakh and commercial real estate 
loans, from the existing level of 0.40 per cent to 1.0 per cent. These provisions are 
eligible for inclusion in Tier II capital for capital adequacy purposes up to the 
permitted ceiling. 
•  With regard to trends in the credit markets, a supervisory review process was 
initiated with select banks having significant exposure to some sectors, namely, real 
estate, highly leveraged NBFCs, venture capital funds and capital markets, in order 
to ensure that effective risk mitigants and sound internal controls are in place for 
managing such exposures. 
•  In October 2005, the RBI restricted banks’ aggregate exposure to the capital market 
to 40 per cent of their net worth on a solo and consolidated basis. The consolidated 
direct capital market exposure has been restricted to 20 per cent of banks’ 
consolidated net worth. 
•  In January 2007, the provisioning requirement was increased to 2 per cent for 
standard assets in the real estate sector, outstanding credit card receivables, loans 
and advances qualifying as capital market exposure and personal loans (excluding 
residential housing loans); the provisioning requirement was also increased to 2 per 
cent for banks’ exposures in the standard assets category to the non-deposit-taking 
systemically important non-banking financial companies (NBFCs); the risk weight 
was increased to 125 per cent for banks’ exposure to non-deposit-taking 
systemically important NBFCs. 




The evolving stance of monetary policy in India 
Highlights 
•  The statement on the stance of monetary policy was introduced from the policy 
statement of April 1996. 
•  The emphasis on price stability and provision of credit to support growth has since 
run through the statements on stance. 
•  Exchange rate stability was underlined in the stance of April 1996. 
•  The pursuit of financial reforms, accelerated investment, improvement in credit 
delivery mechanisms particularly for agriculture and small and medium sectors, soft 
interest rate regime, interest rate signaling and liquidity management were included 
for the first time in the stance of April 1998. 
•  The role of active debt management was emphasized in the stance of April 1999. 
•  Ensuring financial stability came to be recognized from the stance of October 1999. 
•  Macroeconomic stability was emphasized in the stance of April 2004. 
•  The need for support to export demand, stabilization of inflation expectations and 
calibrated actions was underlined in the stance of October 2004. 
•  A prompt and effective response to the evolving situation was underlined in the 
stance of July 2005. 
•  The aspect of credit quality was emphasized in the stance of January 2006. 
•  A swift response to evolving global developments was promised in the stance of 
April 2006. 





Year  Annual policy  Mid term review 
1996–97  Credit support to sustain growth and a 
reasonable degree of price and exchange 
rate stability. 
Price stability and adequate supply of 
bank credit to the productive sectors of 
the economy. 
1997–98  Maintaining reasonable price stability and 
ensuring availability of adequate bank 
credit to support the growth of the real 
sector. 
Promoting price stability and ensuring 
availability of adequate bank credit to 
meet the requirements of productive 
sectors of the economy. 
1998–99  Need to accelerate industrial investment 
and output in the economy; maintenance 
of low rates of inflation; continued pursuit 
of financial reform; reduction in interest 
rates; and improvement in credit delivery 
mechanisms, particularly for agriculture 
and medium and small sectors. 
Flexible use of interest rate instruments 
to signal RBI’s stance regarding 
monetary conditions and management 
of the flow of liquidity in the system. 
1999–00  Provision of reasonable liquidity; stable 
interest rates with policy preference for 
softening to the extent circumstances 
permit; active debt-management; orderly 
development of financial markets; and 
further steps in financial sector reforms.  
Provision of reasonable liquidity; stable 
interest rates with preference for 
softening to the extent possible within 
the existing operational and structural 
constraints; orderly development of 
financial markets and ensuring financial 
stability. 
2000–01  Continue the current stance of monetary 
policy and ensure that all legitimate 
requirements for bank credit are met while 
guarding against any emergence of 
inflationary pressures due to excess 
demand. 
 
2001–02  Provision of adequate liquidity to meet 
credit growth and support revival of 
investment demand while continuing a vigil 
on movements in the price level.  
Within the overall framework of imparting 
greater flexibility to the interest rate regime 
in the medium-term, to continue the 
present stable interest rate environment 
with a preference for softening to the 
extent the evolving situation warrants.  
 
2002–03  Provision of adequate liquidity to meet 
credit growth and support revival of 
investment demand while continuing a vigil 
on movements in the price level. 
Within the overall framework of imparting 
greater flexibility to the interest rate regime 
in the medium-term, to continue the 
present stable interest rate environment 
with a preference for softening to the 
extent the evolving situation warrants. 
Same as outlined in Annual Policy of 
April 2002. 





Year  Annual policy  Mid term review 
2003–04  Provision of adequate liquidity to meet 
credit growth and support investment 
demand in the economy while continuing a 
vigil on movements in the price level. 
In line with the above, to continue the 
present stance on interest rates including 
preference for soft interest rates. 
To impart greater flexibility to the interest 
rate structure in the medium-term. 
Same as outlined in Annual Policy of 
April 2003. 
2004–05  Provision of adequate liquidity to meet 
credit growth and support investment 
demand in the economy while continuing a 
vigil on movements in the price level. 
In line with the above, to continue with the 
present stance of preference for a soft and 
flexible interest rate environment within the 
framework of macroeconomic stability. 
Provision of appropriate liquidity to meet 
credit growth and support investment 
and export demand in the economy 
while placing equal emphasis on price 
stability. 
Consistent with the above, to pursue an 
interest rate environment that is 
conducive to macroeconomic and price 
stability, and maintaining the momentum 
of growth. 
To consider measures in a calibrated 
manner, in response to evolving 
circumstances with a view to stabilising 
inflationary expectations. 




Year Annual  policy First quarter 
review  Mid term review  Third quarter 
review 
2005–06 Provision  of 
appropriate liquidity to 
meet credit growth 
and support 
investment and export 
demand in the 
economy while placing 
equal emphasis on 
price stability. 
Consistent with the 
above, to pursue an 
interest rate 
environment that is 
conducive to 
macroeconomic and 
price stability, and 
maintaining the 
momentum of growth. 
To consider measures 
in a calibrated 
manner, in response 
to evolving 
circumstances with a 
view to stabilising 
inflationary 
expectations. 
Same stance for 
the remaining part 
of the year as set 
out in the annual 
policy Statement 
of April 2005, but 
the Reserve Bank 
would respond, 
promptly and 
effectively, to the 
evolving situation 
depending on the 
unfolding of the 
risks. 
Consistent with 
emphasis on price 
stability, provision 
of appropriate 
liquidity to meet 
genuine credit 
needs and support 
export and 
investment 





is conducive to 
macroeconomic 





measures in a 
calibrated and 








To maintain the 
emphasis on price 
stability with a 
view to anchoring 
inflationary 
expectations. 
To continue to 
support export and 
investment 













liquidity to meet 
genuine credit 
needs of the 








2006–07  To ensure a monetary 
and interest rate 
environment that 
enables continuation 
of the growth 
momentum consistent 
with price stability 
while being in 
readiness to act in a 
timely and prompt 
manner on any signs 
of evolving 
circumstances 
impinging on inflation 
expectations. 
To focus on credit 
quality and financial 
market conditions to 
support export and 
investment demand in 
the economy for  





continuation of the 
growth momentum 
while emphasizing 
price stability with 
a view to 
anchoring inflation 
expectations. 
To reinforce the 




support export and 
investment 
demand in the 
economy for  






demand in the 
economy so as to 
enable 
continuation of the 
growth momentum 
while reinforcing 
price stability with 
a view to 
anchoring inflation 
expectations. 
To maintain the 
emphasis on 
macroeconomic 
and, in particular, 
financial stability. 
To reinforce the 
emphasis on price 









demand in the 
economy so as to 
enable 




credit quality and 
orderly conditions 
in financial  
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Year Annual  policy First quarter 





























as appropriate to 














To respond swiftly 
with all possible 
measures as 
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